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Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, 
and the Enforcement of Law 
 
1. Introduction 
  Law enforcers often solicit individuals to commit criminal acts as a way of 
lowering the cost of apprehending and convicting offenders.  Examples include the use of 
undercover cops to apprehend drug dealers and prostitutes, or their customers.  The 
presumption underlying the use of this strategy is that the target of the solicitation has a 
predisposition to commit the crime in question and therefore will likely commit an actual 
crime if not first apprehended by the police sting. Further, the increased threat of capture 
may deter some potential offenders from committing crimes in the first place.  This logic 
suggests that criminal solicitation can be an effective tool in the arsenal of law enforcers.   
 The principal objection to solicitation, of course, is that it may induce a criminal 
act by someone who otherwise had no intention of breaking the law.  This is the sort of 
person that the entrapment defense is meant to protect.  Specifically, entrapment is 
defined to be the unlawful arrest of a person who was not “predisposed” to commit the 
crime in question (Posner, 2003, p. 231; Shavell, 2004, pp. 564-565).  It is therefore 
aimed at protecting innocent people from overzealousness on the part of law enforcers.1 
 The purpose of this paper is to incorporate the use of criminal solicitation into the 
standard economic model of law enforcement (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000).  The goals of 
the analysis are twofold.  The first is to characterize the optimal use of solicitation as part 
of an overall enforcement strategy.  This involves amending the standard model to allow 
search by potential offenders for “criminal opportunities,” some of which may represent 
                                                 
1
 Entrapments do not necessarily imply corrupt police officers, however, in that there is no necessary intent 
to falsely arrest someone (Stevenson, 2004).   This is what distinguishes entrapment from “framing” 
innocent people.  On the latter activity, see Polinsky and Shavell (2001). 
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“stings” by law enforcers.  For example, a drug dealer searches for buyers, knowing that 
some may be undercover cops.  We characterize two types of social benefits as arising 
from the use of this strategy: the first is a deterrence effect, which is due to the lower 
crime rate as some offenders are deterred from committing any crimes by the higher 
expected probability of apprehension; and the second is a diversion effect, which is the 
savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual 
crimes by means of the solicitation.  At the optimum, these benefits are weighed against 
the marginal enforcement cost (the cost of the last undercover cop hired) plus the 
increased punishment cost (in the case of jail) resulting from the greater certainty of 
apprehension. 
 The second goal of the analysis is to use the model to examine the economic 
justification for, and impact of, the entrapment defense.  We argue that, within the 
context of the model, two types of defendants can claim entrapment: those who were 
actively seeking criminal opportunities but would not have found one but for the 
solicitation, and those who claim that, although they located a criminal opportunity, they 
would not have committed the crime in question but for the extra encouragement of the 
undercover agent.  As to the first claim, it is true that some defendants may argue that 
they would have failed to locate a criminal opportunity if not for solicitation because 
solicitation increases the probability of success (by design).  However, this is not a good 
legal (or economic) defense against prosecution because the very act of searching for an 
opportunity to commit a crime imposes an expected cost on society. 
 The second claim is more legitimate because undercover agents often do offer 
extra inducements to would-be offenders in an effort to obtain an arrest, but the pivotal 
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question is whether this caused the defendant to commit a crime that he otherwise would 
not have committed.  This of course is the crux of the entrapment defense, but it is a 
difficult claim to prove one way or the other because it depends on the predisposition of 
the defendant.  We therefore argue that a better approach is to focus on the conduct of the 
police in making a case for entrapment, a trend that courts in fact seem to be following 
(Stevenson, 2004). 
 The only previous economic analysis of sting operations and entrapment is by 
Hay (2005), who models the court’s problem as one of Bayesian inference, given that a 
certain fraction of offenders caught in a sting are “law-abiding” in the sense that they 
would not have committed the crime but for the sting.  In addition to this sorting (or 
informational) function of stings, Hay examines their deterrent function. Specifically, he 
argues that stings deter would-be offenders (i.e., those actually seeking to commit a 
crime) because they fear that an apparent criminal opportunity may be a sting.  In this 
sense, stings are like low quality goods (or “lemons”) in ordinary markets, which can 
have the effect of reducing the supply of high quality goods (actual criminal 
opportunities), thereby lowering the crime rate. 
 The model in this paper extends and elaborates Hay’s model by incorporating the 
use of stings as an enforcement tool into the standard economic model of deterrence.  
Section 2 sets up the model; Section 3 examines the behavior of potential offenders; 
Section 4 derives the optimal use of criminal solicitation; and Section 5 discusses the 
implications of the analysis for the entrapment defense.  Finally, Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. The Model 
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 The model differs from the standard economic model of crime in that it assumes 
potential offenders must search for criminal opportunities, and that, in a given time 
period, they may or may not be successful in locating one.  In this context, the goal of 
criminal solicitation by law enforcers (the use of “sting” operations) is to create what 
appear to be criminal opportunities (e.g., an undercover cop offering to buy drugs) as a 
way of diverting offenders from actual opportunities, thereby easing apprehension and 
avoiding the social harm caused by the crime.   To capture this formally, suppose that in 
the absence of solicitation there are n potential criminal opportunities available to 
offenders seeking to commit an offense, and x of these represent actual opportunities, 
where x≤n.2  For example, the n opportunities might represent locations where drug 
dealers are known to hang out, and on a given night there is an actual dealer at x of those 
locations.  Thus, a person who visits one of those n locations at random in hopes of 
buying drugs will be successful with probability x/n.    
 Now suppose that the police create y new opportunities, for example by 
disguising undercover cops as drug dealers.  This makes the total number of potential 
criminal opportunities n+y, and the number of actual opportunities (including stings) 
x+y.  As a result, the probability that a potential buyer will succeed in locating an actual 
opportunity (a willing dealer) is now (x+y)/(n+y), and the probability that he will fail is 
(n−x)/(n+y).  If the buyer succeeds in locating a dealer, the conditional probability that it 
is a sting is y/(x+y), in which case the buyer is apprehended and punished with certainty.  
In contrast, the conditional probability that it is an actual dealer is x/(x+y), in which case 
                                                 
2
 The reason for allowing x<n will become apparent in the discussion of the entrapment defense in Section 
5 below. 
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the offender commits the crime and is only later caught and punished with probability 
p<1.  This situation is depicted schematically in Figure 1. 
 The model makes use of the following additional notation: 
 s = dollar value of the sanction (fine or prison) imposed on the offender if 
caught;3 
 k(s) = social cost of punishment if it is prison, k'>0, k"≥0; 
 e(y) = cost of a sting operation, e'>0, e"≥0; 
 c(p) = cost of apprehension if the offender commits an actual crime, c'>0, c"≥0; 
 h = social harm from an actual criminal act; 
 g = dollar gain to the offender from committing a criminal act; 
 gˆ = critical gain beyond which the offender commits a criminal act. 
 In addition to creating additional criminal opportunities, sting operations are also 
usually designed to be especially attractive to potential offenders compared to actual 
criminal opportunities.  We capture this by assuming that the perceived gain to offenders 
from committing the crime is on average higher for stings as compared to actual 
opportunities, reflecting, for example, the extra enticement that undercover agents offer 
as a lure to offenders.  Formally, we assume that the distribution function of g for stings, 
F2(g), is shifted rightward (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) compared to 
the distribution of gains for actual criminal opportunities, F1(g).  That is, 
   F2(g) < F1(g),     for all g>0.     (1)    
Thus, for a given gˆ , an offender who makes contact with an undercover cop will be more 
likely to commit the offense than one who contacts an actual dealer. 
                                                 
3
 We assume that the punishment is the same whether or not the offender is caught in a sting. 
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 Figure 2 depicts the sequence of decisions of a potential offender, and shows the 
resulting payoffs to the offender (O) and society (S) for each of the possible outcomes.  
The game begins when the offender decides to seek a criminal opportunity.4  As noted 
above, he succeeds in locating one with probability (x+y)/(n+y), and fails with 
probability (n−x)/(n+y).  If he fails, the game ends, but if he succeeds, he takes a draw of 
g and commits the act if and only g≥ gˆ .  (The value of gˆ will be derived below.)  
Crucially, an offender who locates a criminal opportunity does not know whether he has 
located a sting or an actual opportunity.  (This is indicated by the dashed line connecting 
the two nodes in Figure 2.) Thus, he does not know whether he is drawing g from F1(g) 
or F2(g).  If the opportunity turns out to be a sting (which occurs with conditional 
probability y/(x+y)), the offender is caught immediately and incurs punishment of s, 
whereas if it is an actual opportunity (which occurs with conditional probability x/(x+y)), 
he receives an expected payoff of g−ps.5   
 As for the social payoffs, note that society incurs the cost of enforcement, 
consisting of the costs of the sting plus apprehension costs e(y)+c(p), in all states of the 
world. This reflects the fact that these costs are independent of the offender’s behavior 
and hence do not depend on whether the offender fails in his search for a criminal 
opportunity, or whether he locates an actual opportunity or a sting.6  In the case where 
punishment is jail time, the punishment cost, k(s), is incurred with certainty if the 
offender is caught in a sting, and with probability p if he commits an actual crime.  
                                                 
4
 We assume that those individuals who do not seek a criminal opportunity are never caught in a sting.    
5
 Note that the current model collapses to the standard model in the case where y=0 and x=n. 
6
 More generally, apprehension costs will vary depending on whether the offender is caught in a sting to the 
extent that some of these costs are variable (i.e., to the extent that they depend on the actual crime rate).  
We adopt the standard assumption here that all such costs are fixed.  It is worth noting, however, that in 
Becker’s original model, the costs of apprehension depended positively both on the apprehension rate, p, 
and the crime rate.  In this formulation, another benefit of stings would be to lower expected apprehension 
costs. 
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Finally, we assume that the offender’s gain, g, and the social harm from an offense, h, are 
only realized when the offender commits an actual crime.7 
 
3. The Offender’s Optimal Behavior 
 Consider first the optimal behavior of a potential offender.  Note that the only 
choice the offender makes is whether or not to commit a crime once he has located a 
criminal opportunity.  (We treat his decision to seek a criminal opportunity in the first 
place as exogenous.) To examine this choice, we need to calculate the critical gain, gˆ .  
Based on the various possible outcomes of his search and the associated probabilities, we 
can calculate the offender’s expected return from committing a crime, once he has 
located a criminal opportunity and observed g, to be 
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The offender will commit the crime if and only if this return is positive, or if and only if 
   g ≥ (p + y/x)s gˆ≡ .      (3) 
It follows immediately from this condition that use of criminal solicitation as an 
enforcement strategy increases deterrence, all else equal (i.e., ∂ gˆ /∂y>0).  This is due to 
the increased probability that the offender will be apprehended, conditional on his 
locating a criminal opportunity, as y increases.  
 
4. Socially Optimal Solicitation 
                                                 
7
 We adopt the convention that the offender’s gain is counted as part of social welfare.  See the discussion 
of this point in Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 48, especially at note 12). 
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 This section derives the socially optimal level of criminal solicitation, taking as 
given the optimal behavior of offenders.  We first consider the case where s is a fine and 
then extend the analysis to the case where it is jail time.   
4.1. Optimal Solicitation when Punishment is a Fine 
 In the case where punishment is a fine, there is no social cost of punishment, so 
k(s)≡0.  Combining the social costs of the various outcomes in Figure 2 with the relevant 
probabilities yields expected social welfare of 
  SW = ∫
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where gˆ is defined by (3).  As noted, the net gains from crime are only realized when the 
offender commits an actual crime (that is, neither g nor h are realized when he is caught 
in a sting).  In this sense, the outcomes where the offender is caught in a sting and where 
he is deterred completely have the same impact on social welfare.  (This is true because 
fines are costless to impose and all enforcement costs are fixed.)  The social problem is 
the choose y, p, and s to maximize welfare. 
 Consider first the optimal level of solicitation, denoted y*.  Taking the derivative 
of (4) with respect to y yields the first-order condition 
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The two terms on the left-hand side of (5) reflect the marginal benefit of solicitation.  
Together, these terms must be positive at the optimum.  Note that a necessary condition 
for this to be true is8  
    hg <ˆ .       (6) 
Thus, there is some degree of underdeterrence.  This is a standard result, reflecting the 
fact that deterrence is costly, so crimes are optimally deterred only up to the point where 
the last dollar spent on enforcement (in this case, on y) equals the net social loss from the 
marginal crime.   
 Returning to (5), note that the first term on the left-hand side is the marginal 
benefit from increased deterrence of crime as y increases; what we refer to as the 
deterrence effect.  This must be positive given (6).  The second term is the expected 
savings in net social harm as some offenders are solicited to commit crimes by the police 
rather than committing actual crimes.9  This is what we call the diversion effect.  At the 
optimum, the sum of the deterrence and diversion effects must equal the marginal cost of 
solicitation.  
 Consider next the optimal apprehension rate for those offenders who commit 
actual crimes.  Taking the derivative of (4) with respect to p (and rearranging) yields the 
first-order condition 
  )()ˆ()ˆ( 1 pcsgfhgyn
x
′=−
+
−      (7) 
                                                 
8
 That is, if (6) holds, the first term on the left-hand side of (5) is positive while the second term may be 
positive or negative.  However, at the optimum, the first term must dominate.  In contrast, if (6) does not 
hold, both terms on the left-hand side are negative, which is inconsistent with e'>0. 
9
 It is possible that this term is negative, meaning that the diversion effect actually reduces the net gain to 
society from the act in question.   This possibility is a consequence of counting g as part of social welfare.  
If only h is counted, the diversion effect will always be positive. 
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This has the standard interpretation that the marginal benefit of the greater deterrence 
from increased p should be equated to the marginal cost.  (Note again that the left-hand 
side is positive by (6).) 
Given condition (6), it is interesting to ask how use of solicitation affects the 
optimal apprehension rate.  That is, are y and p complements or substitutes? To answer 
this, differentiate (7) with respect to p and y, treating y as a parameter.  The result is 
∂p/∂y<0.10  That is, the optimal apprehension rate goes down as y is increased, implying 
that when solicitation is used as a part of an enforcement strategy, the police can devote 
less effort to apprehension.  Thus, not surprisingly, solicitation and apprehension efforts 
are substitutes. 
 Finally, consider the optimal fine.  As in standard enforcement models, the fine 
should be maximal (i.e., equal to the offender’s wealth, w) because it is costless to 
increase the fine.  As usual, this is proved by assuming that s is less than maximal.  Then, 
s can be raised while p and/or y are lowered so as to hold gˆ (and hence the crime rate) 
fixed.  But since this causes social costs to fall, the original s could not have been 
optimal. It follows that s*=w. 
4.2. Optimal Solicitation when Punishment is Jail Time 
 When punishment takes the form of jail time, k(s)>0, and social welfare becomes 
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∞ ∞
−−
+
−−−
+ g g
pcyegdFsk
yn
ygdFspkhg
yn
x
ˆ ˆ
21 )()()()()()]([ , (8) 
                                                 
10
 See the Appendix for details.  In order to sign ∂p/∂y, it is necessary to assume that f1'≤0, or f1'>0 but 
small.  The sign of f1' reflects marginal changes in the crime rate.  Thus, f1'≤0 is sufficient (but not 
necessary) to ensure a diminishing marginal benefit of enforcement. 
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where gˆ continues to be given by (3) and s is now interpreted as the dollar cost to the 
offender of jail time.  Optimal solicitation in this case is found by maximizing (8) with 
respect to y.  The relevant first-order condition is 
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The first two terms on the left-hand side represent the deterrence effect of solicitation, 
while the next two terms represent the diversion effect.  The difference here compared to 
the case of fines is that these benefits now account for the saved punishment costs for 
those crimes that are deterred, as well as the offsetting increase in costs for those 
offenders who are caught by the sting. Since the net effect of these punishment costs is 
ambiguous (given that a sting results in punishment with certainty), y may be higher or 
lower here compared to the case of fines.   
 The optimal choice of p in this case solves the first-order condition 
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which has the same interpretation as (7), except for the addition of k(s).  Finally, the 
optimal prison term solves the first-order condition 
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In contrast to the fine, the optimal prison term is not necessarily maximal but instead 
balances the marginal benefits from increased deterrence (the left-hand side) against the 
marginal cost of punishment (the right-hand side).11  
 
5. Application to the Entrapment Defense 
Entrapment is a defense that can be raised by a criminal defendant who claims 
that solicitation by an undercover agent caused him to commit a crime that he otherwise 
would not have committed.  Thus, it is not a claim that the defendant is in fact innocent of 
the crime in question, but rather that the police unduly contributed to his guilt.  
Consequently, the traditional test for entrapment places primary emphasis on the 
defendant’s state of mind at the time he committed the crime (Stevenson, 2004).   
 From this perspective, the model provides two possible justifications for 
entrapment.  First, the offender could argue that, although he was seeking a criminal 
opportunity, he would not have found one but for the solicitation.  To evaluate this claim, 
recall that the probability of locating a criminal opportunity, conditional on searching for 
one, is given by (x+y)/(n+y), which is increasing in y (given n>x).  Thus, the use of 
criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy (i.e., the fact that y>0) does indeed 
increase the likelihood that an offender will locate a criminal opportunity of some sort.   
From an economic perspective, however, this is a weak argument for exonerating 
a defendant because, once he has made the decision to seek a criminal opportunity, he 
increases the expected costs of law enforcement, regardless of whether he is subsequently 
caught in a sting, or whether he commits any crime at all.  Any offender who 
                                                 
11
 This result is in contrast to Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 54) who showed that when punishment is 
exclusively jail time and p is endogenous, the optimal jail term is maximal.  The same result would hold 
here if y=0 and k"=0.     
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purposefully seeks a criminal opportunity (i.e., all defendants in the current model) has 
criminal intent (or mens rea) and therefore should be punished as a way of enhancing 
deterrence.12  In this sense, punishing offenders caught in a sting serves the same purpose 
as fining speeders or punishing failed criminal attempts (Shavell, 2003, pp. 556-559). 
 The second possible basis for an entrapment claim according to the model is that 
an offender caught in a sting could argue that, although he succeeded in locating a 
criminal opportunity, he would not have committed the act but for the extra 
encouragement offered by the undercover agent.  That is, the sting caused the realized 
gain from committing the crime to exceed the critical gain, gˆ , thereby inducing the 
defendant to commit a crime that he otherwise would have found unprofitable.  In terms 
of the model, this argument would be valid if the sting lowered gˆ , increased g, or both.  
As to the first possibility, recall from (3) that gˆ  is increasing in y, implying that the use of 
a sting actually reduces the likelihood that an offender will commit a given act, owing to 
the deterrence effect.  The model therefore does not support this basis for an entrapment 
claim.   
It does, however, support the argument that the extra inducement offered by the 
undercover agent may raise the perceived gain from the crime enough to surpass the 
critical level, thereby inducing the offender to commit the act.  Formally, because the 
sting shifts the distribution of gains to the right (as implied by condition (1)), it must be 
the case that for a given gˆ ,    
                                                 
12
 Hay (2005) considers the possibility that some “law-abiding” citizens will be caught in a sting, but 
because he does not formally model the decision of offenders to commit crimes, it is not clear how 
individuals without criminal intent are caught.  Clearly, it never promotes deterrence to punish individuals 
who did not actually intend to commit a crime (indeed, punishment of innocent people dilutes deterrence—
see Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 60)), but as noted above, “victims” of entrapment are not truly innocent 
in this sense.    
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   1–F2( gˆ ) > 1–F1( gˆ ).      (12) 
That is, the offender is more likely to commit a crime when his search for a criminal 
opportunity turns up a sting rather than an actual opportunity.  Taken together, the two 
effects suggest that the use of stings as an enforcement tool has an ambiguous effect on 
the crime rate: on one hand, it deters crime because of the increased chance of 
apprehension, but on the other, it encourages crime by enhancing the perceived gain.  The 
paradigmatic entrapment case therefore depends on the defendant’s proving that, in his 
particular case, the second effect dominated the first. In other words, the realized g would 
not have exceeded gˆ  but for the extra inducement offered by the undercover agent 
(suggesting that the defendant was not “predisposed” to commit the crime in the absence 
of the sting). 
 The preceding analysis reveals the difficulty in proving an entrapment claim 
under the traditional test, given its dependence on the defendant’s state of mind.  A better 
approach, and one that courts are increasingly adopting, focuses attention not on the 
defendant’s circumstances, but on the observable behavior of the police (Stevenson, 
2004).  In this perspective, the function of the entrapment defense is to distinguish 
legitimate undercover activities by the police (those that raise welfare), from illegitimate 
ones (those that lower welfare).13  In applying this test, courts consider evidence of police 
misconduct or overzealousness in the conduct of sting operations,14 rather than case-
specific factors pertaining to the defendant.  In terms of the model, this would involve 
                                                 
13
 Both Posner (2003, p. 231) and Shavell (2004, pp. 564-565) make this point. 
14
 There is a large literature on police corruption.  See, for example, Becker and Stigler (1974), Mookherjee 
and Png (1995), Polinsky and Shavell (2001), and Garoup and Klerman (2004).   
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asking whether y>y*, or whether F2 is shifted too far to the right compared to F1.15  In 
either case, the finding of entrapment would be independent of the proclivities of any 
individual defendants caught in the sting.   
In economic terms, this represents a sensible change because it replaces a 
subjective test with a more objective one (Stevenson, 2004, p. 72).16  More importantly, 
however, it focuses the court’s attention on policies under the control of the police and 
hence represents a more direct way of promoting optimal law enforcement, which after 
all is the true economic function of the entrapment defense. 
   
6. Conclusion 
 This paper has shown that criminal solicitation, or the tempting of individuals to 
commit criminal acts by police deception, can be a useful component of an overall law 
enforcement strategy.  Solicitation provides the dual benefits of deterring some offenders 
from committing crimes altogether (because they anticipate the higher probability that 
they will be caught), and of diverting others from committing actual crimes that would 
have imposed actual harm on victims. The primary drawback of solicitation is the risk 
that it may “entrap” individuals who otherwise would not have committed a crime, 
thereby artificially increasing the crime rate.  By invalidating such false arrests, the 
entrapment defense provides an important safeguard against excessive use of solicitation 
by the police.   
                                                 
15
 We treated this shift as exogenous in the model, but it could be made endogenous by writing the 
distribution of gains from a sting as F(g,a) where a is a shift factor reflecting the extent of inducements 
offered by undercover police. 
16
 It is presumably easier for courts to observe evidence of police misconduct than the predisposition of 
defendants. 
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The results suggest, however, that the proper test for entrapment should be based 
on the conduct of the police rather than the predisposition of the defendant to commit the 
crime in question.  Such a test is preferred both because it involves an evaluation of 
evidence that will generally be more objective in nature, but also because it focuses 
attention on the true function of entrapment as a tool for promoting more efficient law 
enforcement.  Recent trends suggest that courts are in fact moving in this direction.       
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Appendix 
 
 This appendix derives the expression for ∂p/∂y referred to in the text.  Totally 
differentiating (7) with respect to p and y yields: 
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The first term in brackets is negative by the second order condition for an optimal p, and 
the second term in brackets is also negative if either f1'≤0, or f1'>0 but small.  (Recall that 
gˆ  −h<0 by (6).)  Thus, f1'≤0 is sufficient but not necessary for ∂p/∂y<0, as asserted in the 
text. 
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Figure 1.  Schematic depiction of a potential offender’s criminal opportunities. 
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Figure 2. Sequence of decisions by a potential offender with the resulting payoffs to the 
offender (O) and society (S). 
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